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The Plight of Small Issuers*
(And Others) Under Regulation D:
Those Nagging Problems
That Need Attention
RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
Regulation D' traces its roots to section 4(2)2 and section
3(b)3 of the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter referred to as the
"1933 Act"). Both of these sections are designed to relieve an
issuer from the pains of registration under the 1933 Act in
situations where Congress deemed such registration inappro-
priate. Therefore, under section 4(2), no registration is required
for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing." ' 4 Section 3(b) is not a self-executing exemption but instead
permits the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the "Commission") to enact rules and regulations
exempting issuers from registration requirements "if it finds that
... [registration] is not necessary in the public interest and for
the protection of investors by reason of the small amount in-
volved or the limited character of the public offering. .. "
* "Small issuer" as used in this Article means a company or other business entity
(e.g., a limited partnership) that is relatively small in size (i.e., has a relatively small
dollar amount of assets) and that has no active market for its stock (i.e., stock is not
traded on the NASDAQ system or some national exchange).
** Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, Centre College; J.D.
1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.
The author thanks Jane Ellen Broadwater for her help in the preparation of this
Article.
1 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1984).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
Id. § 77c(b) (1982).
Id. § 77d(2).
Presently, § 3(b) is limited to offerings of $5 million or less. Id. § 77c(b) (1982).
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Section 4(2) has a long, rich6 and often confusing history7
and has played an important role in the sales of securities outside
the registration process.' Notwithstanding the significance of this
statutory exemption, the popularity of and interest in this ex-
emption over the years has been subject to an apparent ebb and
flow. The exemption's nadir, at least in modern times, must
have been in the early 1970's, when a series of cases from the
Fifth Circuit9 were read (or perhaps feared) 0 by some to say
that the section exempts only sales to insiders."
At about that time, 12 the Commission, partially in response
to the confusion and apprehension generated by such cases, 3
promulgated Rule 146. Under the provisions of that rule, an
offering under section 4(2) was considered exempt from the
registration requirements if certain criteria were met. More spe-
cifically, Rule 146 prohibited general advertising,' 4 required gen-
erally that the offerees and purchasers be sophisticated,15 required
6 See Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 485, 505-11 (1975) for a list
of the writings regarding section 4(2) up to the date of that Article.
7 See McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IowA L. REV. 525, 549
(1974) (the author refers to the exemption as a "tale of growing confusion"); Meer, The
Private Offering Exemption Under The Federal Securities Act-A Study In Administra-
tive And Judicial Contraction, 20 Sw. L.J. 503, 534 (1966) ("Reliance on the non-public
offering exemption in any financing not involving a private placement with institutional
type investors is a hazardous risk.").
I See Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L.
Rev. 869, 871 (1959) (section 4(2) characterized as "probably the most frequently used
of all the exemptions"); 25 SEC STATisTIcAL BULL. No. 3, at 13 (Mar. 1966).
9 S.E.C. v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v.
Hayden Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
10 See, e.g., Kripke, Wrap-up in Revolution in Securities Regulation, 29 Bus. LAvi.
185, 187 (Special Issue Mar. 1974).
" The Fifth Circuit later attempted to explain these cases. Doran v. Petroleum
Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977).
11 Rule 146 became effective June 10, 1974. Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr.
23, 1974), 1 FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH) q 2710, at 2902.
11 "The Rule is designed to provide more objective standards for determining when
offers or sales of securities by an issuer would be deemed to be transactions not involving
any public offering within the meaning of Section 4(2) ... ." Id.
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (1981). In addition to newspaper and magazine advertise-
ments, general advertising was defined to include seminars and letters, unless all persons
attending the seminars and all persons receiving the letters were qualified offerees.
11 Id. § 230.146(d). Rule 146 required that all offerees and all purchasers be
qualified. To be a qualified offeree, one had to be either wealthy or sophisticated. To
be a qualified purchaser, one either had to be sophisticated or had to be wealthy and
have an offeree representative who was sophisticated.
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that purchasers have access to information about the offering, 6
limited the number of purchasers to thirty-five 7 and imposed
restrictions on the resale of the securities. 8
Unfortunately, Rule 146 was an ill-conceived exemption, 9
and its flaws were apparent from the beginning. The rule was
unnecessarily technical, cumbersome, out of balance and con-
tained some requirements that were nearly bizzare. With regard
to small issuers, the rule was literally unavailable in most in-
stances. A combination of costs, unnecessary technicalities and
impossible resale provisions usually foreclosed small issuers from
using the rule. 20
Unlike section 4(2), section 3(b) lay fallow for decades. Prior
to 1975, the Commission's only implementation of the section
was Regulation A, 2' which essentially allowed small public of-
ferings of securities pursuant to somewhat abbreviated disclosure
documents, and Rule 237, 22 which permitted very limited resales
of restricted securities after the purchaser held the securities for
five years. Both of these provisions, however, had only limited
significance for issuers attempting to sell securities outside the
registration provisions of the 1933 Act.23
16 Id. § 230.146(e). Under Rule 146, each purchaser was required to have access to
all material information about the issuer or to be supplied with all material information
about the issuer.
7 Id. § 230.146(g).
1 Id. § 231.146(h). Because securities purchased in a Rule 146 transaction were
within the exemption of section 4(2), the resale of those securities was subject to the
same resale restrictions as securities purchased under a traditional section 4(2) offering.
Therefore, for example, such securities would be included within the definition of
"restricted securities" under Rule 144 and thus could be resold within the terms of that
rule. Id. § 230.144(a)(3) (1984).
11 Commentators were often quite harsh in the assessment of rule 146. See Kripke,
SEC Rule 146: A "Major Blunder", N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1974, at 1, col. 2; Kesseler, Private
Placement Rules 146 and 240 - Safe Harbor?, 44 FoRsHAii L. REV. 37 (1975); Kind-
erman, The Private Offering Exemption: An Examination of its Availability Under and
Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus. LAw. 921 (1975); Weinberg & McManus, The Private Placement
Exemption Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 [sicJ Revisited and Rule 146,
27 BAYLOR L. REv. 201 (1975); Heumann, Is Rule 146 Too Subjective to Provide the
Needed Predictability in Private Offerings?, 55 NEB. L. REv. 1, 9 (1975).
" See Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers under the Securities Act of 1933:
Practical Foreclosure From the Capital Market, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1139 (1977).
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1984).
Id. § 230.237 (1983). Rule 237 was rescinded effective October 31, 1983. Securities
Act Release No. 6488 (September 23, 1983), [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 83,429, at 86,249.
2 Generally, Regulation A is unattractive to small issuers because of the inability
1985-861
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The Commission's adoption of Rule 24024 in 1975 was a
significant development under section 3(b). That rule, the spir-
itual predecessor of Rule 504 of Regulation D,2 provided an
exemption from registration if the sale did not involve any
general advertising, no solicitation fees were paid to brokers or
others, the aggregate offering did not exceed $100,000 in any
twelve month period, the issuer had one hundred or fewer share-
holders and certain restrictions on resales were observed.
26
In 1978, the Commission used section 3(b) as a basis for
another rule, Rule 242.27 That rule, the predecessor of Rule 505
of Regulation D, 28 provided an exemption from registration for
sales of securities up to the maximum amount permitted by
section 3(b) if there were no general advertising, there were a
maximum of thirty-five purchasers, S-18 information were fur-
nished to the purchasers and certain resale limitations were ob-
served .
29
At about the same time, the Commission apparently realized
that it needed to take a hard look at the special problems of
small issuers under the federal securities laws. As a result, the
Commission held a series of hearings during 1978 to solicit
comments from interested parties.30 This author, as well as nu-
merous other commentators, presented the Commission with a
variety of views and information concerning the problems of
small issuers. Thereafter, the Commission made several adjust-
ments in the rules under which issuers (and particularly small
issuers) could sell their securities.
to "coordinate" a Regulation A offering with state law. Thus, any savings that may be
generated by the abbreviated procedures of the regulation are lost when the issuer is
required to register by "qualification" with the states. See Campbell, supra note 20, at
1140-42. As concerns Rule 237, its limited usefulness was due to the long holding period
(five years) and the small amount that could be sold each year (the lesser of one percent
of the outstanding stock or $50,000).
24 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1981).
- Id. § 230.504 (1984).
Id. § 230.240(c)-(h) 0981). Section (h) of the rule required the filing of a simple
notice of sale. See Securities Act Release No. 5560 (January 24, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,066, at 84,945, for a discussion of the rule.
17 C.F.R. § 230.242 0980).
- Id. § 230.505 (1984).
- Id. § 230.242(c)-(h) (1980).
" The Commission announced the proposed hearings early in 1978. Securities Act
Release No. 5914 (Mar. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) q
81,530, at 80,149.
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Regulation D became effective on April 15, 198231 and was
the most obvious rule change that occurred after the Small
Business Hearings. By repealing Rules 146, 240 and 24232 and
adopting Regulation D, the Commission attempted to address
many of the problems that rankled commentators and perplexed
practitioners. Although one must certainly concede the improve-
ments of Regulation D, small issuers (and others) still face
unnecessary obstacles under Regulation D.
This Article describes certain areas in which Regulation D
continues to subject small issuers and, to some extent, larger
issuers to indefensible standards and requirements. The Com-
mission should. address these areas and, where necessary, should
petition Congress to lend its assistance.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF REGULATION D
Rule 504 provides an exemption from registration under the
1933 Act for offerings of up to $500,000. 33 Rule 505 exempts
offerings of up to $5 million 3 4 and Rule 506 exempts offerings
without any amount limitation. 35 Rules 501, 502 and 503 provide
the definitions 3 6 general conditions37 and filing requirements3
for the three exemptions. If the requirements of Rule 504 or
Rule 505 are met, the offering is exempt pursuant to section
3(b) of the 1933 Act.3 9 By complying with the conditions of Rule
506, an offering is exempt pursuant to section 4(2). 40
A. Rule 504
Rule 504 exempts from registration offerings up to $500,000, 4'
if the issuer meets certain conditions. The exemption, which is
' Securities Act Release No. 6389 (March 8, 1982), [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,106, at 84,907.
-2 The release adopting Regulation D announced the repeal of Rules 146, 240 and
242. Id.
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1984).
-4 Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
'4 Id. § 230.506.
"4 Id. § 230.501.
I4 d. § 230.502.
"4 Id. § 230.503.
" Id. § 230.504(a); Id. § 230.505(a).
• Id. § 230.506(a).
41 In addition to the rule itself, the Commission has, through its no-action letters,
1985-86]
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not available to companies that are subject to the periodic re-
porting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"1934 Act"), 42 prohibits general advertising, 43 restricts the resale
of the securities purchased in a Rule 504 transaction," obligates
the issuer to take certain steps to insure that resales are limited4
and requires the issuer to file a notice with the Commission on
Form D.
46
Equally important are the "non-requirements" of Rule 504
(i.e., those factors that are not prerequisites to the rule's avail-
ability). There are no purchaser qualifications, which means that
the offering does not have to be limited to sophisticated or
wealthy individuals. Also, there are no disclosure requirements47
and no limitations on the number of purchasers that can acquire
securities pursuant to Rule 504,48 and the exemption is available
to limited partnerships and other noncorporate entities. 49 Finally,
provided some guidance concerning the calculations of the maximum offering under
Rules 504 and 505. See id. § 230.501(c); 12 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2), Notes I and 2 (1983);
Niles Federal Savings & Loan Association, SEC No-Action letter (Aug. 30, 1982) (avail-
able on Lexis, Fedsec library, No act file); In re Kim R. Clark, Esq., SEC No-Action
letter (Nov. 8, 1982) (available on Lexis, Fedsec library, No act file).
42 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (1984).
4I Id. § 230.502(c).
I d. § 230.502(d).
41 Under Rule 502(d), the issuer is required to exercise "reasonable care to assure
that the purchasers of the securities are not underwriters .. .," including making
"reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is acquiring the securities for himself
or for other persons . . .," providing written disclosures to purchasers explaining the
restrictions on resales and placing a legend on the securities disclosing the restrictions
on resales. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) 0984).
46 Id. § 230.503. Although the filing requirements of Rule 503 are not major
obstacles to the availability of the exemption provided by Regulation D, one aspect of
the rule deserves comment. Failure to file the Form D in a timely manner causes the
exemption to be lost. That is an excessive and inappropriate remedy. It robs the issuer
of the exemption and, accordingly, subjects the issuer to liability for its lawyer's mistake.
The need to ensure the filing of Form D does not justify such an extreme remedy.
Rather, a fine or late charge should be assessed in those situations. Although one should
not overdramatize the significance of Rule 503, it is an example of the lack of balance
that the Commission too often manifests.
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1984).
41 Rule 240 provided that after the sale under the rule, the stock of the issuer
could not be owned by more than 100 persons. Id. § 230.240(f) (1981). This limitation
was omitted from Rule 504, although, as indicated in the text, companies reporting
under section 13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act cannot utilize Rule 504. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)
(1984).
" Rule 242, for example, was not available for offerings of limited partnership
interests. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(b) (1981).
SMLL ISSUERS UNDER REGULATION D
there are no prohibitions against paying selling commissions in
connection with a Rule 504 offering.
50
B. Rule 505
Rule 505 exempts offerings up to $5 million from the regis-
tration requirements if certain conditions are met.5 1 As with Rule
504, there is a prohibition against general advertising, a limita-
tion on the resale of securities purchased pursuant to a Rule 505
offering and a requirement to file a Form D with the Commis-
sion.5 2
Qualification under Rule 505, however, requires two addi-
tional, significant conditions. First, an issuer is normally re-
quired to disclose certain prescribed information as a prerequisite
to the availability of the exemption. This criterion typically
requires disclosure of the information that would be required by
Form S-18.11 Second, the maximum number of purchasers in a
Rule 505 transaction is normally limited to approximately thirty-
five.
5 4
Again, the nonrequirements of Rule 505 are as significant as
its requirements. Specifically, there is no offeree or purchaser
qualification requirement and the exemption is available to lim-
ited partnerships and other noncorporate issuers. The disclosure
requirements are suspended if the offering is limited to "ac-
credited investors, ' ' 55 and in calculating the maximum number
of investors, accredited investors are not included.
5 6
- Rule 240 prohibited the payment of any remuneration "for soliciting any pro-
spective buyer . .. " 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(d) (1981). Unfortunately, the exemptions from
registration at the state level that are available for a Rule 504 offering often prohibit
the payment of any commissions or solicitation fees. See, e.g., Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §
292.410(i) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984).
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b) (1984). For certain Commission no-action letters regarding
calculations of the maximum offering price, see note 41 supra.
See notes 43-46 supra.
" The rule requires only the most recent fiscal year's financial statements to be
certified. Also, the right to disclose only S-IS information depends on whether the form
would be available if the offering were registered. Thus, for example, if the transaction
involves a merger, one would be required to use Form S-4. Finally, issuers reporting
under the 1934 Act can meet the disclosure requirements by using annual reports, proxy
statements and periodic reports filed with the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 502(b) (1984).
'4 Rule 505 limits the number of purchasers to thirty-five, but in calculating the
number, "accredited investors" are excluded. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (1984).
Id. § 230.502(b)(l)(i).
Id. § 230.501(e)(1)(v).
1985-86]
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C. Rule 506
Rule 506 provides an exemption from registration without
imposing any limitation on the dollar amount of the offering.
Essentially, the exemption requires disclosure of the same kdnd
of information contained in a registration statement 7 and limits
the sale either to persons that are sophisticated or to accredited
investors.58 As with Rule 505, Rule 506 also prohibits general
advertising, limits resales of the securities, requires filings of a
Form D and limits the number of purchasers to approximately
thirty-five.
5 9
From an issuer's point of view, Rule 506 is the most bur-
densome of the Regulation D rules. The most important of these
added burdens are the more extensive disclosure requirement and
the requirement that all purchasers either be capable of evalu-
ating the merits and risks of the investment or be accredited
investors. Because of these added burdens, issuers normally will
not rely on Rule 506 for offerings of less than $5 million but,
instead, will utilize either Rule 505 or Rule 504. Rule 506,
therefore, is not as significant for small issuers, since their capital
requirements usually do not require a $5 million offering.
II. A COMMENDABLE ATTEMPT AT BALANCE
The Commission, within the structure of Regulation D, ap-
parently attempted to balance the need for investor protection
with the need to provide cost efficient access to the capital
markets. As a result, there are fewer disclosure requirements
under Regulation D as the size of the offering decreases. Thus,
for offerings over $5 million, an issuer not reporting under the
57 More precisely, the level of disclosure by an issuer not reporting under the 1934
Act is determined by the size of the offering rather than the rule involved. Realistically,
Rule 506 will usually be confined to offerings in excess of $5 million, and, in that
instance, Rule 502b)(2)(i)(B) requires the "same kind of information as would be
required in Part I of a registration statement filed under the Act on the form that the
issuer would be entitled to use." Issuers reporting under the 1934 Act can effect
disclosure by providing purchasers with certain 1934 Act disclosure documents (e.g.,
annual reports, periodic reports filed with the Commission and proxy statements). 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1984).
I- Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
59 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1) requires that all conditions of Rules 501-03 be met.
The referenced requirements are contained in those rules, except the limitation on the
number of purchasers, which is found in Rule 506(b)(2)(i). Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
[Vol. 74
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1934 Act is often required to provide the disclosures mandated
in Form S-i. For offerings between $5 million and $500,000, the
issuer is usually required to disclose essentially the information
required by the less extensive Form S-18. For offerings below
$500,000, no disclosures are required as a prerequisite to the
exemption's availability, 60 although the antifraud provisions ne-
cessitate disclosures .61 Similarly, there usually are no purchaser
qualification requirements for offerings of less than $5 million.
Only offerings under Rule 506 contain any purchaser qualifica-
tions,62 and normally offerings under that Rule are in excess of
$5 million.
Requiring less disclosure and fewer purchaser qualifications
as the offering decreases accomodates the realities faced by an
issuer utilizing Regulation D. Providing extensive disclosure and
ensuring compliance with purchaser or offeree qualifications are
expensive to an issuer, and the indiscriminate use of these mech-
anisms by the Commission can practically foreclose an issuer
from using a particular exemption.
The problem with Regulation D, therefore, is not the under-
lying fundamental philosophy of the rules but, instead, is the
implementation of that philosophy. Issuers attempting to qualify
for an exemption under Regulation D are required to meet a
number of requirements that significantly add to the cost of
compliance without any corresponding increase in investor pro-
tection. These problems are especially difficult for small issuers.
III. SMALL ISSUERS UNDER REGULATION D: A CRITIQUE
The Commission needs to address the problems of Regula-
tion D. With some attention, Regulation D can become a fair,
clear and well-balanced set of rules.
Specifically, the Commission should undertake the following:
1. Eliminate Regulation D's prohibition against general ad-
vertising.
2. Adjust the disclosure requirements of Regulation D.
3. Modify the resale restrictions of Rule 144.
4. Eliminate the integration concept.
- Id. § 230.502(b)(1).
' See notes 96-106 infra and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1984).
1985-86]
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Understandably, some may consider the foregoing sugges-
tions extreme. A careful analysis, however, reveals that the
proposals would maintain investor protection while effectively
broadening the availability of Regulation D to small issuers.
A. The Prohibition Against Advertising
1. The Special Problems of Small Issuers
For a number of reasons, it is difficult for small issuers to
raise capital by the sale of stock. Initially, professional under-
writing services are practically unavailable, since small deals do
not generate sufficient underwriting profits to justify participa-
tion by investment bankers. 63 Even if the small issuer has larger
capital needs, however, it is difficult to persuade an investment
banker to underwrite an offering. After all, investment bankers
are not much different from automobile dealers, at least in some
respects. They both make money by selling a quality product in
an efficient manner and must, therefore, avoid situations in
which the selling effort is expensive or the product is inferior.
Investment bankers consider offerings by small issuers to be
hard, expensive sales64 that involve high risk to their customers.
As a result, investment bankers tend to limit their underwriting
activities to larger, more seasoned companies.
The issuer and its officers, directors and owners are, there-
fore, often forced to bear the burden of selling the issuer's
securities. This is a difficult task, since a small issuer's manage-
ment typically has neither the skills, time nor experience neces-
sary to sell securities.
This is not to say that small issuers are unable to sell their
own securities in all instances. Each of us who practice in this
area has examples of situations in which issuers marketed their
63 In the fall of 1984, this writer acted as counsel to a company in the public
offering of $4 million in common stock. In selecting an underwriter, the company talked
to four investment bankers. Two of those houses rejected the company as a client in
substantial part because the deal was too small.
Not only is it hard for the salesman at the retail level to interest customers in
new offerings from unseasoned companies, it is also very expensive for the investment
banker's department of corporate finance to evaluate and educate itself regarding such
a company. This means less profit for the investment banking firm and is one reason
investment banking firms are reluctant to take on small companies as clients.
[Vol. 74
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own stock, and in certain instances issuers raised substantial
amounts of capital without the aid of underwriters.
Unfortunately, the prohibition against general advertising
places an unnecessary obstacle in the path of a small issuer
trying to offer securities pursuant to Regulation D. The prohi-
bition provides no protection to investors but does make it more
difficult for a small issuer to attract investment bankers or to
sell securities on its own behalf.
2. The Commission's View and Its Impact on Selling Deals
The prohibition against general advertising contained in Rule
502(c) is incorporated into the requirements of Rules 504, 505
and 506. As a result, an "issuer" or "any person acting on its
behalf" cannot use any "general solicitation or general advertis-
ing" in connection with an offering pursuant to Regulation D. 61
The definition of general solicitation or general advertising in-
cludes "but is not limited to ... (1) Any advertisement, article,
notice or other communication published in any newspaper,
magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio;
and (2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been
invited by any general solicitation or general advertising. ' 'e
In order for an issuer's conduct to violate the prohibition
against general solicitation or general advertising, there must be
a "solicitation" or an "advertising," and it must be "general."
The notion of a solicitation or an advertising is apparently
coextensive with that of an "offer" under section 2(3) of the
1933 Act.67 As a result, the Commission, in deciding whether the
conduct of an issuer involves a solicitation or an advertising, is
often faced with questions similar to ones it has faced in other
contexts, such as "gun jumping" in public offerings. 61 For ex-
ample, one no-action request asked whether an issuer would be
engaged in a general advertising under Regulation D if it contin-
ued to "promote its products and services through newspaper,
radio and television media at the same time as it [was] conduct-
' Id. § 230.502(c).
A Id.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982)).
' "Gun jumping" refers to premature offers by issuers involved in public offerings
of securities. See 1 L. Loss, SEcuRrrmis REGULATION 194-97, 215-21 (2d ed. 1961).
1985-861
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ing an offering of securities in reliance on Regulation D. "69
Another inquiry raised the question of whether a tombstone ad70
announcing the completion of a Regulation D offering could be
considered general advertising.7' The real issue in these cases, of
course, was whether the activity involved an "offer" of the
issuer's securities. 72
By examining the Commission's releases and no-action letters
interpreting Regulation D and the concept of an "offer" under
section 2(3) of the 1933 Act, one can glean an insight into how
the Commission defines "solicitation" or "advertising." For
example, in a no-action response to Alaska Company, the Com-
mission concluded without much difficulty that an offer would
be involved where a "finder" acting on behalf of an issuer in a
Regulation D offering contacted potential investors, briefed them
"on the nature of the offering, the minimum amount that they
would be required to purchase and the total amount of the
offering" and referred interested persons to the issuer. 73 On the
other hand, in an earlier release, the Commission advised issuers
"in registration" 74 that no offer would be involved if an issuer
9 Printing Enterprises Management Science, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (March
23, 1983), [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) j 77,415, at 78,517-2.
70 A "tombstone ad" is a "notice, circular, advertisement, letter or communication
in respect of a security" that is excepted from the definition of a prospectus and
therefore does not have to meet the requirements of a prospectus embodied in section
10 (Securities Act of 1933 § 10 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1982)). A tombstone ad
must contain information on "from whom a written prospectus meeting the requirements
of section 10 may be obtained." The ad must do no more than "identify the security,
state the price thereof, state by whom orders will be executed" and contain any other
information deemed necessary by the Commission. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10)(b)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(b) (1982)). "Because of the format which advertisements
took under the pre-1954 language-and still do for the most part-they are universally
if somewhat lugubriously known as 'tombstone ads.' " L. Loss, supra note 68, at 227.
" Alma Securities Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 2, 1982) (available
on Lexis, Fedsec library, No act file).
72 In its response to Alma Securities Corporation, the Commission stated, "The
relevant questions under Regulation D... is whether or not the tombstone advertisement
is used to offer or sell securities." Id.
" Alaska Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 10, 1978) (available on Lexis, Fedsec
library, No act file). This no-action response was issued under Rule 146. The language
in Rule 146 was similar to Regulation D regarding the general advertising prohibition.
' "In registration" is defined by the Commission as "the entire process of
registration, at least from the time an issuer reaches an understanding with the broker-
dealer which is to act as managing underwriter prior to the filing of a registration
statement and the period of 40 to 90 days during which dealers must deliver a pro-
spectus." Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 5180 n.1 (Aug. 16, 1971) (available on
Lexis, Fedsec library, Release file).
SMALL ISSUERS UNDER REGULATION D
continued to advertise its products and services, 7 sent customary
periodic reports and proxy statements to its shareholders, an-
nounced factual business and financial developments to the press
and responded to unsolicited inquiries regarding factual infor-
mation.
76
In a no-action response to Alma Securities Corporation, a
securities firm involved in the placement of interests in drilling
programs asked the Commission whether publication of tomb-
stone ads announcing the completion of a Regulation D offering
would constitute a general solicitation or advertising. Again, the
real question was whether such tombstone ads would constitute
an "offer," since the publication of these advertisements would
certainly be "general." The Commission refused to opine in that
situation, concluding that it did not have enough facts to re-
spond. The response did state, however, that a tombstone ad
might be permissible "following the completion of an isolated
Regulation D offering where the advertisement would have no
immediate or direct bearing on contemporaneous or subsequent
offers or sales of securities." ' 77 The Commission indicated that
a tombstone ad would constitute an offer, however, if an issuer
involved in ongoing programs of private placements employed
tombstone ads to announce the completion of each individual
program .7  The apparent concern of the Commission was that
the advertisement for the completed deals could be an advertise-
ment for contemporaneous or future deals.
All of these releases and responses indicate that the Com-
mission utilizes an intent or purpose test in determining whether
the conduct of an issuer involves a solicitation, advertisement or
offer. Thus, a solicitation, advertisement or offer will be in-
volved if the conduct of the issuer is intended "to awaken an
interest which later would be focused on the specific financ-
11 In a no-action letter regarding Regulation D, however, the Commission indicated
that product advertising could in some instances be considered a solicitation or an
advertising. See Printing Enterprises Management Science, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
supra note 69, at 78,517-2.
71. Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 5080 (August 16, 1971) (available on Lexis,
Fedsec library, Release file). See also Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 5009 (Oct. 7,
1969) (available on Lexis, Fedsec library, Release file); Securities Act of 1933, Release
No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957) (available on Lexis, Fedsec library, Release file).
" Alma Securities Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 71.
SId.
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ing .... ,'79 On the other hand, if the issuer's conduct has in-
dependent significance and purpose, it will not be deemed a
solicitation, advertisement or offer, even though it may have a
positive impact on the issuer's ability to market its securities.
This is the reason an issuer can normally continue to advertise
its products and solicit proxies during a Regulation D offering."0
Either of these activities, however, could constitute a solicitation
or advertising, if the facts indicate that the real purpose of the
conduct were to promote the Regulation D offering by the issuer.
Although it is difficult in some instances to decide whether
a particular course of conduct involves a solicitation, advertising
or offer, the determination of whether the conduct is "general"
typically is a more perplexing and prevalent problem. Invariably,
issuers ask "How many offers can I make?". Just as invariably,
the issuer's counsel is unable to provide a clear answer to this
question.
Nevertheless, one is able to draw certain general conclusions
about the Commission's interpretation of the meaning of "gen-
eral." First, an offer obviously will be "general" if it is made
through a vehicle that reaches an undetermined number of per-
sons. Thus, an offer in an airline's in-flight magazines' or an
offer in a thoroughbred horse trade magazine 2 would be "gen-
eral."
Second, offers may still be considered "general", even though
limited to persons who are sophisticated or "accredited" .3 In
its response to the Texas Investment Newsletter, the Commission
concluded that an offer to two thousand accredited investors
would be general.84 In a response to Tax Information Corpora-
tion, the Commission concluded that a general advertising would
be involved if an offer went to an undetermined number of
7' Securities Act Release 3844, supra note 76, at example 1.
' See Securities Act Release No. 5180, supra note 74.
"In Damson Oil Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (July 5, 1974) (available on
Lexis, Fedsee library, No act file), the staff concluded that this raised "serious questions"
concerning the availability of Rule 146.
82 Aspen Grove, SEC No-Action Letter (December 2, 1982) (available on Lexis,
Fedsec library, No act file).
1, But see Woodtrails-Seattle Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (August 9, 1982) (avail-
able on Lexis, Fedsec library, No act file), where the Commission issued a no-action
letter involving 330 sophisticated offerees.
1' The Texas Investor Newsletter, SEC No-Action Letter (January 23, 1984) (avail-
able on Lexis, Fedsec library, No act file).
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accountants and lawyers in Louisiana. 85 Finally, in a proposed
Regulation D offering involving thoroughbred horses, the Com-
mission concluded that the issuer could not offer the securities
to an undefined number of members of the Thoroughbred Own-
ers and Breeders Association.
8 6
Third, indiscriminate offers, even if the actual number of
offers is not excessive, are more likely to run afoul of the
prohibition against general advertising than are offers to the
same number of persons who have been screened and evaluated
by the issuer. Thus, the Commission did not allow the appar-
ently indiscriminate distribution of offering materials at a thor-
oughbred horse sale,88 nor did the Commission permit apparently
indiscriminate offers to the lawyers and accountants in a partic-
ular state. 9 But, in the Woodtrails no-action letter, the fact that
the offerees had been evaluated and carefully selected by the
issuer apparently was important to the Commission's approval
of an offer to 330 persons. 90
Finally, the number of offerees obviously is important in
determining whether the offer is general, although one must be
wary of the nearly overwhelming temptation to rely exclusively
on such quantification. Two no-action responses are instructive
in this regard. In the Woodtrails no-action response, the Com-
mission concluded that no general advertising would be involved
if offers were made to approximately 330 persons.9' The Com-
mission, however, reached an opposite result where an issuer
proposed to make an offer to two thousand persons.92
Although the Woodtrails letter may well represent the limit
of the Commisson's tolerance for large offerings, one should
not assume, for example, that an indiscriminate offer to ap-
proximately 330 persons randomly selected from the telephone
1 See Tax Investment Information Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (February
7, 1983) (available on Lexis, Fedsec library, No act file).
Aspen Grove, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 82.
See Woodtrails-Seattle Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (August 9, 1982) (available
on Lexis, Fedsec library, No act file).
1 See Aspen Grove, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 82.
F, See Tax Investment Information Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, supra
note 85.
See Woodtrails-Seattle, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 87.
"' Id.
" See The Texas Investor Newsletter, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 84.
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book would pass muster. In its response in Woodtrails, the
Commission emphasized that the offerees had a preexisting re-
lationship with the issuer, were sophisticated and met certain
financial suitability standards. Without such facts, Commission
approval of an offering to such a large number of offerees is
unlikely.
Thus, as a practical matter, an issuer attempting to complete
a Regulation D offering may be unwilling to press to the limit
outlined in the Woodtrails response. Concerns for safety may
cause issuers and their counsel to limit their offers to a number
well below the 330 approved in Woodtrails.
For example, this writer, in advising clients, usually starts
by asking the client for the least number of offerees necessary
to complete the deal. Sometimes this question resolves the mat-
ter, if the client, for example, indicates that he can live with
forty or fifty offerees. Often, however, an issuer indicates that
he would like to make an offer to one hundred or more persons,
and, at that point, the analysis becomes more complex.
This writer thinks that one should feel fairly comfortable in
making one hundred discriminate offers. Thus, while 3ne should
not make offers to one hundred unknown persons selected from
the telephone book, one hundred offers to persons whc have
been determined by the issuer to be potentially interested inves-
tors should not violate the prohibition against general advertis-
ing. This does not imply any need to impose suitability or
sophistication requirements, unless otherwise required under
Regulation D. Further, if those offers do not result in the deal's
being sold out, offers to additional persons, similarly screened
and selected, should not cause the offering to become general.
3. The Case for Eliminating the
Prohibition Against General Advertising
Imposing a general advertising prohibition on issuers (espe-
cially small issuers) is unnecessary and illogical and, thus, is
impossible to justify under any cost-benefit analysis. The pro-
hibition makes location of investors significantly more difficult
for small issuers, while providing no protection to investors.
Two points are significant in this regard. First, it is exceed-
ingly difficult for small issuers to sell their securities. As de-
scribed earlier, brokers typically are unavailable to assist these
small issuers, and, as a result, the issuer and its management
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must bear the burden of selling the company's securities. Even
if the small issuer is able to find a broker to help, the broker
will face substantial difficulty in marketing the securities. To
restrict the issuer and broker further by limiting their ability to
place advertisements in newspapers or magazines, for example,
removes an effective technique for locating investors. This pro-
hibition may eliminate the issuer's only real chance at attracting
outside investors, especially if the issuer must go it alone.
Second, one must keep in mind what the removal of the
prohibition against general advertising would not do. It would
not eliminate any sophistication or disclosure requirements under
Regulation D. Rather, these requirements would still be imposed,
to the extent they presently are, prior to the sale of the security.
Under Rule 502(b)(1)(ii), therefore, issuers would still be obli-
gated to furnish "to any purchaser that is not an accredited
investor the ... [required information] during the course of the
offering and prior to sale." 93 Similarly, in a Rule 506 offering,
the issuer would still be subject to the requirement that it "rea-
sonably believe immediately prior to making any sale that each
purchaser . . .94 is either accredited or sophisticated.
95
This is the reason that the removal of the general advertising
prohibition would not harm investors. So long as the protective
provisions of Regulation D, such as disclosure and offeree qual-
ification requirements, are imposed at the purchaser level, inves-
tors are adequately protected. Since the protective provisions
would still be in place when the investor makes his investment
judgment, it seems impossible to conclude that allowing general
advertising harms investors.
B. The Disclosure Requirements
In constructing its rules regarding exemptions from the reg-
istration requirements, the Commission must maintain a delicate
balance between the need to protect investors and the need to
foster capital formation.96 Nowhere is this balance more difficult
03 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii) (1984).
- Id. § 230.506 (1984).
9'Id.
Evidence indicates that the Commission was late in recognizing or accepting this
idea. In enacting Rule 146, for example, the Commission made no attempt to fashion
disclosure requirements that were reasonable for small offerings. See Campbell, supra
note 20, at 1144-46.
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to maintain than in setting the appropriate level of disclosure in
exempt transactions. Although the Commission, to its credit,
attempted to accomodate these competing needs in Regulation
D, 97 at least one adjustment is needed. The Commission should
raise the threshold for requiring Form S-18 information from
$500,000 to $1 million.
Under Regulation D, offerings of up to $500,000 typically
are made under Rule 504. There are no disclosure requirements
prerequisite to the availability of that exemption.93 Offerings of
$500,000 to $5 million are usually made under Rule 505, and
small issuers normally are required to provide investors with
basically the same information that is contained in a registration
statement filed on Form S-18.99 The cost of this disclosure im-
poses a significant and usually unacceptable burden on small
issuers attempting to raise between $500,000 and $1 million.
Generalization about the costs of complying with SEC dis-
closure requirements is always difficult. As people who work in
the area can attest, the legal and accounting expenses of one S-
18 offering literally can be three times as much as the costs of
another S-18 offering, even though the two companies and the
two offerings are roughly the same size. '0 Nonetheless, experi-
ence indicates that legal and accounting expenses may exceed
$30,000 for an offering with Form S-18 disclosures. These ex-
- The basic scheme of Regulation D is to require more extensive disclosures as
the deals get bigger. Typically, therefore, deals of less than $500,000 do not require
disclosure as a prerequisite to the availability of Regulation D. Deals between $500,000
and $5 million require the information that would be required in Form S-I8, and deals
in excess of $5 million require the same information that would be required if the deal
were registered. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1984).
Id. § 230.502(b)(1)(i).
19 In certain situations, Form S-18 is not the appropriate form for the disclosure
requirements in a Rule 505 offering. If the sales are made only to "accredited investors"
no disclosure is required. See id. § 230.502(b)(1)(i). If Form S-18 is not available to the
issuer, the otherwise applicable form must be used. Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A). Further,
certain deviations from Form S-18 are permitted. Financial statements are required only
for two years, and only one year is required to be audited. Id. The Form S-I8 information
is required to be furnished "to the extent material to an understanding of the issuer, its
business and the securities being offered." Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(i). Finally, companies
reporting under the 1934 Act can fulfill the disclosure requirements by furnishing certain
of their periodic reports, annual reports and proxy statements. Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii).
,00 One of the major factors in this regard is the sophistication of the issuer's in-
house staff. Some issuers have people in-house who can bear the major burden in
gathering information and writing the disclosure document. In other instances, outside
counsel may have to do everything.
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penses, amounting to 6% of a $500,000 offering, may drive the
issuer's cost of capital to an unacceptable level. Regulation D,
therefore, may be practically unavailable for small issuers wish-
ing to sell $500,000 to $1 million in securities.' 0 '
To determine whether it is sensible to raise the threshold of
S-18 disclosure to $1 million, however, one must also consider
whether investors would thereby be denied access to meaningful
information about the issuer. This writer is convinced that they
would not.
In the first place, investors would be protected by market
forces.'0 2 Investors today are accustomed to seeing disclosure
documents when they lay out their cash. As a result, issuers who
want to sell their stock feel some market pressure to provide
information to investors through offering circulars, even when
not required by the 1933 Act. Although one may be unwilling to
rely entirely on market forces to insure disclosure, one certainly
should not dismiss these pressures as irrelevant.
The antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act,
however, generate additional significant investor protection. 0 3
Presently, these provisions provide appropriate protection for
investors in deals of less than $500,000, and it would be entirely
sensible to rely on the antifraud rules for Regulation D offerings
up to $1 million.
One must understand that these antifraud provisions provide
more than after-the-fact relief for fraud. The practical in terro-
rem effects of these provisions cause issuers to provide formal-
ized disclosures to investors (i.e., some sort of offering circular
or memorandum), even in instances where such disclosures are
not a prerequisite to the availability of an exemption. Offering
circulars are used in these situations to try to insulate the issuer
"' This writer's rule of thumb is that issuers should not tolerate or, indeed, be
asked to tolerate legal and accounting expenses in excess of five percent of an offering.
That amount, actually, is exorbitant. One must never forget that these expenses do not
go to purchase the productive assets of the company.
,"I There is a body of scholarship that argues in favor of eliminating required
disclosures and thereby relying exclusively on market forces to generate sufficient disclo-
sure. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONolac ANALYSIS OF LAW 332 (2d ed. 1977).
11-, The most significant of these provisions are section 12(2) under the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), and § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(10) (1982), and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1984), under the 1934 Act.
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from claims that it failed to disclose all material facts to the
investors and thereby violated the antifraud provisions.
As a result, issuers normally are willing to underwrite the
expense of these offering circulars. In fact, only in unusual
situations has this writer been involved in exempt offerings that
did not use an offering circular. l4 This seems to be the common
practice with other securities attorneys as well.
Typically, these antifraud disclosure documents are more
concise than and omit much of the material contained in disclo-
sure documents based on registration forms. Likewise, require-
ments such as audited financial statements are no longer
applicable. 05 This allows the issuer to recognize even more sav-
ings.
These factors, however, do not necessarily result in a poor-
quality disclosure document. In fact, this writer would argue
that such antifraud documents may result in better disclosure
than those that slavishly follow the boiler-plate-ridden docu-
ments of seventy pages or more. These latter documents tend to
be poorly organized, excessive in length and riddled with irrele-
vant, repetitive and confusing information, much of which is in
the document solely to ensure compliance with a particular reg-
istration form. It is not hard to argue that better disclosure may
be effected through a twenty page disclosure document written
by an experienced attorney who is charged only with providing
all material information.e 6
114 The one situation in which this writer feels fairly comfortable in not using an
offering circular is where a corporation is started by five people, for example, each of
whom has had some participation in the formation of the company and will be involved,
at least to some extent, in the operation of the business.
'05 Form S-18 requires the submission of an audited balance sheet for one year and
an audited income statement for two years. Form S-18, Item 21(b) and (c), 2 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) j 7303, at 6431-12 (June 19, 1985). Regulation D provides, however,
that if the Form S-18 information is applicable for offerings of less than $5 million,
"only the financial statements for the issuer's most recent fiscal year must be certi-
fied .... " 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A) (1984).
11 A personal experience supports this argument. While engaged in practice, this
writer did a significant amount of work in the horse industry. The firm with which he
was associated developed a disclosure document that it used in horse deals (i.e., the sale
of securities by partnerships, limited partnerships, syndicates and corporations engaged
in the horse business) where disclosure was not a prerequisite to the availability of the
particular securities exemption. That document would usually consist of approximately
twenty-five pages, and this writer believes that it provided better disclosure to the average
investor than the seventy to one hundred page documents used in larger deals.
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The Commission should become comfortable with allowing
the antifraud rules to protect investors in small deals. This writer
is convinced that the theory works well. Allowing counsel to
make judgments about disclosure based on a materiality standard
allows the person closest to the deal to fashion an appropriate
level of disclosure in light of all relevant factors, including just
how much cost the issuer can bear.
C. Resale of Securities Purchased in a Regulation D Offering
For any exemption from registration to work, investors must
be able to resell their securities in some reasonable manner.
Without such a resale opportunity, investors will be unwilling to
invest in an enterprise and, as a result, issuers will encounter
difficulty raising capital for particular projects.
Securities purchased under Regulation D are restricted as to
resale, having "the status of securities acquired in a transaction
under section 4(2) . ."17 (securities purchased under Regulation
D are hereinafter referred to as "restricted securities"). As a
result, there are three ways that investors can practically resell
these restricted securities (persons purchasing securities from an
issuer in a private placement under section 4(2) or in a Regula-
tion D offering are hereinafter sometimes referred to as "hold-
ers"). First, holders can resell in private transactions pursuant
to the "section 4(1 1/2)" exemption; 03 second, holders can pub-
licly resell restricted securities pursuant to a section 4(1) trans-
action; 109 finally, holders can resell pursuant to Rule 144.110 It is,
however, often unnecessarily difficult and sometimes practically
impossible for holders of securities in small issuers to resell
restricted securities pursuant to these provisions.
1. Resales Under Section 4(11/2)
To effect a resale pursuant to the section 4(11/2) exemption,
the restricted securities must be sold in a transaction not involv-
'c" 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1984).
'c There is, of course, no section 4(1 1/2) under the 1933 Act. It is called a section
4(1 1/2) transaction because the original issuer of the securities relies on its exemption
under section 4(2), and the reselling investor relies on the exemption in section 4(1) of
the 1933 Act. The theory of the exemption is more fully explained at notes 111-23 infra
and accompanying text.
--' 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982).
11 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1984).
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ing any public offering. In that event, the issuer's original private
placement exemption pursuant to section 4(2) is maintained,
since all of the sales and resales meet the requirements of section
4(2) (i.e., constitute "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering" 1"). The holder's resale is exempt under section
4(1), since it involves "transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer.1 112 Obviously, the reselling holder
is not an "issuer ' " 3 or, it is assumed, a "dealer.' 11 4 The holder
is not an "underwriter" unless he purchased his securities from
the issuer "with a view to . .. distribution." '  Private resales
by a holder (i.e., sales not involving any public offering) do not
constitute a "distribution," since the Commission regards the
terms "distribution" and "public offering" as synonomous."1
6
Because these private resales do not constitute a "distribution,"
the holder is not considered to have purchased "with a view to
distribution" and, thus, would not be considered an underwri-
ter.' 1
7
The foregoing analysis suggests that resales pursuant to the
section 4(1 1/2) exemption must meet the same criteria applied
to sales by an issuer under the private placement exemption of
section 4(2). 118 Such resales, therefore, should be made only to
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
Id. § 77d(l).
Id. § 77b(4).
114 Id. § 77b(12). Regarding the definition of a "dealer" and the regulation generally
of brokers and dealers under federal law, see N. WOLFSON, R. PmLLS & T. Russo,
REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SEcuRrmEs MARKTS (1977).
-" 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I1) (1982).
116 WHEAT REPORT SEC DISCLOSURE GROUP, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CosIs-
SION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADhNISTRATIVE POLIcIS
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 161-62 (CCH) (1969) (hereinafter cited as "WHEAT
REPORT"); I L. Loss, supra note 68, at 551; Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems
Respecting the Registration Requirements Under the Securities Act, 13 Bus. LAW. 296,
370 (1958).
"I For an excellent discussion of Section 4(1 1/2), see The Section "4(1 1/2)"
Phenomenon, Private Resales of "Restricted Securities", 34 Bus. LAW. 1961 (1979)
(hereinafter cited as Section 4 (11/2) Phenomenon).
"I At least one set of commentators seem to reject the idea that resales under
section 4(1 1/2) must comply strictly to the informational disclosure requirements of
section 4(2). See Section 4(11/2) Phenomenon, supra note 117, at 1976 ("[W]e consider
the better view to be that only the manner of sale and the number of purchasers are
relevant.... We find no basis ... to impose the requirements that the Purchaser be
sophisticated or have access to registration-type information."). It is this writer's opinion,
however, that resales of restricted securities without disclosure of or access to the same
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sophisticated purchasers, and each purchaser must be supplied
with or have access to the same information about the issuer
that would be contained in a registration statement."l 9
information that would be required in a section 4(2) offering creates a significant risk
that such resales would not be exempt under a section 4(1 1/2) exemption. See, e.g.,
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959). In fact, the commentators cited in this note concluded, after reviewing the major
cases in the area: "The Purchasers' sophistication and access to information appear to
have been viewed as essential in five of the six decisions." Section 4 (11/2) Phenomenon,
supra note 117, at 1971.
- Although the exact requirements of a private offering pursuant to section 4(2)
have been the subject of controversy over the years, there seems to be general consensus
that the offerees and purchasers must be supplied with or have access to the same
information that would be contained in a registration statement and must be sufficiently
sophisticated to evaluate the merits and risks of the proposed deal. See, e.g., Schwartz,
Private Offering Exemption: Recent Developments, 37 OMO ST. L.J. 1, 17 0976). See
Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private Placements, 14 REVIEW OF SEcuRmzIs REGU-
LAiioN 869 (1981), for a somewhat different approach.
Regarding the private resale of restricted securities, one author has stated:
All resale of securities in reliance upon this exemption must satisfy all of
the following general requirements:
1. The Purchaser The purchaser must be financially responsible and
therefore able to bear the economic risks of his purchase should that
investment prove unsatisfactory. The purchaser must also be a "so-
phisticated investor" capable of discerning the merits and risks of his
investment....
2. Information Regarding the Issuer The purchaser must be given
all the relevant information (i.e., that which would be contained in a
registration statement) regarding the issuer ... or at least given access
to this information....
3. Manner of Sale [A] seller relying on this exemption cannot pub-
licly solicit purchasers through brokers or by means of advertisements
offering circulars and the like....
4. Acquisition for Investment [T]he purchaser in a private sale must
agree to acquire his shares for investment and not with a view to resell
or distribute them.
D. GOLDWASSER, TiE PRACTITIONER'S CoMPREHENsIVE GUIDE TO RuLE 144 (1975).
In summarizing the case law regarding resales pursuant to section 4(1 1/2), one
group of commentators concluded:
1. The appropriate exemptive provision is section 40) and not 4(2).
2. No particular holding period is required.
3. The Purchasers' sophistication and access to information appear to
have been viewed as essential in five of the six decisions.
4. The number of purchasers, viewed alone, is not dispositive of the
availability of an exemption.
5. Restrictions on resales by a Purchaser generally have not been required.
6. No decision has articulated an affirmative duty on a Holder to provide
registration-type information to a Purchaser.
Section 4(11/2) Phenomenon, supra note 117, at 1970-71.
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The applicability of these criteria often makes it difficult for
investors in small issuers to resell restricted securities in section
4(1 1/2) transactions. In this regard, the burden imposed by the
access to information requirement is the most onerous, since it
may be impractical, or actually impossible, for investors holding
restricted securities to acquire and provide the purchasers with
the same information that would be contained in a registration
statement.
In some instances, of course, the information requirement
may be met without unreasonable burden or expense. For ex-
ample, if the issuer originally utilized Rule 505 and provided the
investors with an offering circular pursuant to Rule 502(b), 2°
the holder might be able to supply information to the new
purchasers by merely updating that offering circular. This is a
perfectly sensible use of the section 4(11/2) exemption and pro-
vides an efficient mechanism for the resale of restricted securi-
ties.
Problems arise, however, if the original offering circular
becomes dated. If the issuer's original offering were eighteen
months ago, for example, the expense of updating the offering
circular would become more significant. New financial state-
ments and updated narrative information would be required,
and the entire offering circular would have to comply with the
registration form applicable at the time of resale.
21
The problem is even more difficult if the issuer's original
Regulation D offering were made either without any offering
circular 22 or pursuant to an offering circular designed only to
meet the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.'2 In those
'2 Under Rule 502(b), the availability of Rule 505 normally depends upon supplying
each purchaser with "[t]he same kind of information as would be required in Part I of
Form S-18. . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A) (1984).
"I There are a number of technical problems generated by such an update. Probably
the most important would be the question of whether the updated financial information
would have to be audited. Form S-18, which may be the applicable form, requires audited
statements and unaudited interim statements current within 135 days of the offering. See
item 21 of Form S-8, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) j 7303, at 6431-12 to 6431-17 (June 19, 1985).
'2 Under Regulation D, no information is required for offerings made under Rule
504 (involving amounts of $500,000 or less) or made only to accredited: investors. 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(i) (1984).
'" For a discussion of the use and content of an offering circular in an offering
not requiring disclosure as a prerequisite to the availability of Regulation D, see text
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situations, it is especially burdensome and expensive for holders
to provide purchasers of restricted securities with the same in-
formation contained in a registration statement (a requirement
for the section 4( 1/2) exemption). Because no such information
was gathered and rendered at the time of the original offering,
it is impossible merely to update existing information. If the
total proposed sale of the restricted securities is only $10,000,
for example, the size of the resale will not support the expenses
necessary to prepare such disclosure documents.
The foregoing problems are especially likely to occur when
holders of restricted securities in a small issuer attempt to resell
under section 4(1 1/2). First, a small issuer is more likely to
utilize Rule 504 for the initial offering, and Rule 504, as previ-
ously noted, does not require disclosure as a prerequisite to its
availability. A reselling holder, therefore, may be faced with a
de novo preparation of the disclosure document. In addition,
holders of restricted securities in a small issuer are more likely
to have relatively small investments in the issuer. Thus, they
need to resell less stock, making it economically unfeasible to
provide the extensive disclosures that may be required under
section 4(1 1/2).
One should not conclude from this discussion that investors
in small issuers can never rely on section 4(1 1/2) as a way to
resell restricted securities taken in a Regulation D offering.
Rather, one should be aware that section 4(1 1/2) is not a panacea
for all resale problems faced by investors in small issuers and
that in a significant percentage of situations the expense and
difficulty in meeting its apparent requirements may foreclose
section 4(1 1/2) from being a practical resale alternative.
2. Public Resales of Restricted Securities Outside Rule 144
Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act provides an exemption from
registration for offers and sales by persons other than issuers,
accompanying notes 102-06 supra.
Offering circulars used in offerings where disclosure is not a prerequisite to the
availability of an exemption under Regulation D normally contain less information than
is required in a registration statement. Transforming such an offering circular into a
document that contains all of the information required in a registration statement, a
step that may be necessary in order to comply with the Section 4(11/2) exemption, would
seem to be a difficult and expensive undertaking.
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underwriters or dealers. Concerning securities purchased in pri-
vate placements under section 4(2), the theory developed that a
holder at some point can resell his securities in a public trans-
action pursuant to section 4(1). 124 To avoid characterization as
an "underwriter," which is the key issue in such resales, the
holder selling in a public transaction must establish that he has
a proper "investment intent" at the time he purchased the
restricted securities. This investment intent removes the holder
from the definition of "underwriter," since it means that the
holder did not purchase his securities from the issuer "with a
view to distribution.' ' 25 Although in such an instance the holder
may have purchased his securities from the issuer and may make
a "distribution," his investment intent establishes that, at the
time he purchased the securities, he did not have a "view" to
distribute.
2 6
As a corollary, such a resale by a holder that purchased with
an investment intent will not destroy the issuer's original section
4(2) exemption. The issuer's original private placement is con-
sidered complete when the restricted securities come to rest in
the hands of holders who possess an investment intent. 2 7
The most important factor in establishing investment intent
is the period of time between the holder's original purchase and
his resale. The longer that period of time, the easier it is to
conclude that the subsequent public resale is not inconsistent
with the holder's initial investment intent. 2 8 The "change in
circumstances" doctrine may also be relevant in this regard.
That doctrine provides that a subsequent public resale can be
reconciled with an initial investment intent by a change in the
holder's circumstances that causes the holder to change his orig-
inal investment intent. 2 9
"' See generally, I L. Loss, supra note 68, at 665-73; Volk & Schneider, The Sale
of Restricted Securities Outside of Rule 144, EIGHTH ANNUAL INsTITuTE OF SECuRIms
REGULATION 135-48 (1977); WHEAT REPORT, supra note 116, at 160-77.
1- 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
'6 See generally note 124 supra.
117 See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 116, at 161-62.
"I Section 4(1 1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 117, at 1972 (1979) ("[The] existence
of a relatively long holding period serves a dual function, both sustaining the seller's
original investment intent and evidence that any 'distribution' by the seller is not 'for
the issuer.' ").
'1 See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEculuTIEs REGULATION 146-47 (1985);
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 116, at 166-70.
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Because the holding period and the existence of changed
circumstances are mere evidence that the holder possessed no
intent or view to distribute at the time he purchased, it is
generally believed that there can be some trade-off between the
two factors. Thus, the longer the holding period, the less dra-
matic the required change in circumstances. On the other hand,
if the holding period is short, a more significant change is
required. 13 0
Although the application of these concepts in concrete in-
stances may be difficult, public resales of restricted securities
were, prior to the adoption of Rule 144, regularly undertaken
pursuant to the foregoing analysis.13 ' In 1972, however, in a not
too subtle piece of in terrorem administrative action, the Com-
mission attempted to overrule this common law of resales and
force all public resales of restricted securities into Rule 144
transactions. This was accomplished by the release adopting Rule
144, in which the Commission stated:
(1) "the 'change in circumstances' concept should no longer
be considered as one of the factors in determining whether a
person is an underwriter"; (2) "the fact that securities have
been held for a particular period of time does not by itself
establish the availability of an exemption"; (3) "the staff will
not issue no-action letters relating to resales of such [restricted]
securities"; and (4) persons making sales of restricted securities
outside Rule 144 "will have a substantial burden of proof in
establishing" the legality of the resales.
32
Notwithstanding the uncertainty created by the Commission's
pronouncements, there is obvious support for the conclusion
that public resales of restricted securities can be undertaken
outside Rule 144 after a three year holding period. Indeed, there
is authority that a two year holding period is adequate.
The Commission itself is one source of authority for the
legitimacy of resales after a three year holding period, since the
last word from the staff was that three years is sufficient. 3
'' D. GOLDWASSER, supra note 119, at 374-75.
"' Resale by Institutional Investors of Debt Securities Acquired in Private Place-
ments, 34 Bus. LAW. 1927, 1947 (1978-79).
M Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,487, at 81,050.
M' D. GOLDWASSER, supra note 119, at 364-65.
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Interestingly, both Sommer and Loss have recalled that the
Commission earlier seemed willing to permit such resales after
only a one year holding period. 3 4 Later, the Commission ap-
parently increased the holding period to two years and finally
settled on a three year holding period, 135 which it generally
applied in its no-action letters until the adoption of Rule 144.
Commentators invariably agreed that a three year holding period
met the Commission's informal holding period requirements, 3 6
and one writer emphatically stated that it was "firmly established
through literally hundreds of letters that the staff requires a
three year holding period . . ." for such resales.1
7
Although the case law on the subject certainly is not over-
whelming, it does support the adequacy of a three year holding
period. In fact, the case law supports an even shorter holding
period.
In United States v. Sherwood 3 8 one of the few cases dealing
with this matter, and certainly the most cited on this issue, the
court faced the question of whether Sherwood, who had held
his restricted securities for two years, could resell those securities
without filing a registration statement. Although Sherwood in-
volved a charge of a criminal contempt and thus required the
prosecution to demonstrate its case "beyond a reasonable
doubt,"'' 39 the court's language on the particular issue of the
two year holding period was clear and strong:
The passage of two years before the commencement of distri-
bution of any of these shares is an insuperable obstacle to my
finding that Sherwood took these shares with a view to distri-
bution thereof, in the absence of any relevant evidence from
11 Sommer, Considerations Leading to the Adoption of Rule 144, 67 Nw. U.L.
REv. 65, 69 (Supp. 1972); 1 L. Loss, supra note 68, at 671-72.
" Sommer, supra note 134, at 69.
116 Id.; D. GOLDWASSER, supra note 119, at § 12.02; Section 4(11/2) Phenomenon,
supra note 117; T. HAZEN, supra note 129, at 145; Schneider, Acquisitions Under the
Federal Securities Acts-A Program for Reform, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1323, 1337 (1967-
68).
'" D. GOLDWASSER, supra note 119, at § 12.02.
175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
,' See id. at 484. In his treatise, Professor Hazen makes the following statement
about Sherwood: "Since this arose in a criminal case with higher standards of proof, a
longer holding period might arguably apply in a civil or SEC enforcement proceeding."
T. HAZEN, supra note 129, at 145.
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which I could conclude he did not take the shares for invest-
ment.'"
This writer is convinced, therefore, that the case law, com-
mentators and even the Commission's own statements support
the conclusion that holders of restricted securities can, except
under unusual circumstances, 4' resell after a three year holding
period. 142
Notwithstanding this view, however, it seems clear that the
Commission has had its way regarding public resales outside
Rule 144, because the confusion and terror created by the Com-
mission's pronouncements have effectively throttled these public
resales. Although there have been some attempts by commen-
tators to remedy this situation, 143 individuals continue to believe
the Commission's 1972 Release. Attorneys, therefore, are gen-
erally willing to render favorable opinions regarding such resales
only "in very limited situations,"' 144 and public resales outside
I'l 175 F. Supp. at 483. In another case, the Second Circuit held that ten months
was an insufficient holding period for the resale of restricted securities. See Gilligan, Will
& Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 896 (1959).
'I These "unusual circumstances" should indeed be unusual and should be limited
to instances where there is an attempt to circumvent the non-public requirement of the
initial offering by the issuer. For example, the issuer may sell securities to a holder in a
section 4(2) transaction, with the holder paying for the securities with notes. The holder,
after retaining the securities for three years, might resell the securities publicly and repay
the debt to the issuer with the proceeds from the public offering. Such a scheme, if the
result of collusion between the issuer and the holder, and if undertaken to evade the
impact of the 1933 Act, should not meet the holding period requirements.
142 One can find statements indicating that a three year holding period is not
necessarily determinative. See Section 4(1 1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 117, at 1972
("generally three or more years"); Sommer, supra note 134, at 69 ("SEC staff refused
to say unequivocally that if a purchaser held his securities for three years he could
dispose of them in a public offering without any restraints."). On the other hand, one
can find statements indicating that a two year holding period may be sufficient to
establish one's investment intent. T. HazEN, supra note 129, at 145 (indicating that the
Sherwood case was "the basis of a two year rule of thumb for the holding period.");
Schneider, supra note 136, at 1337 ("probably two to three years").
"' See T. HAzaN, supra note 129, at 145-47; Volk & Schneider, supra note 124.
I" See Lipton, Fogelson & Warnken, Rule 144-A Summary Review After Two
Years, 29 Bus. LAW. 1183, 1198 (1973-74), where the authors state:
In view of the strong policy statement of the SEC in Release No. 5223
...."it would appear that counsel may render favorable opinions as to
sales outside the Rule of post-144 restricted securities only in very limited
situations-those where the issuer is a major listed company, the amount
can be sold readily without material effect on the market ... and there
has been a holding period substantially more than two years (probably in
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Rule 144 continue to involve levels of risk that are considered
unacceptably high to holders and issuers of restricted securities.
3. Resales Under Rule 144
Because of the difficulty of reselling restricted securities pri-
vately under section 4(1 1/2) or publicly under the common law
of section 4(1), holders often must utilize Rule 144.145 Needlessly
restrictive provisions, however, may cause the rule to be un-
available for the holders of restricted securities of small issuers.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 144, commentators often crit-
icized the common law regarding public resales, pointing out
that conditioning the right to resell restricted securities on the
investment intent of the holder made no sense on any policy
basis. Commentators argued that the holder's state of mind at
the time he purchased the particular securities had little to do
with the need for disclosures upon resale.' 46
To address these problems, the Commission, in 1972, pro-
mulgated Rule 144.147 As originally adopted, the Rule permitted
the resale of up to one percent of the issuer's outstanding
securities every six months if information about the issuer was
currently available, the holder had owned the securities for two
years and the sales were effected only in brokers' transactions.' 43
The rule was designed to allow the resale of restricted securities
only where information about the issuer is available and the
transaction itself is not the type that historically has been a
source of abusive selling tactics.' 49
the area of three to five years). Substantially the same standards are
applicable to pre-144 restricted securities, except that the current three-year
holding period is generally considered adequate. Most lawyers will not give
an opinion in either situation where the company is marginal or the amount
of securities cannot be readily absorbed by the normal trading market, no
matter what the holding period.
See also Fogelson, Rule 144-A Summary Review, 37 Bus. LAV'. 1519 (1981-82); Note,
Rule 144: SEC Regulation of Dispositions of Securities by Controlling Persons and
Private Placements, 25 VAND. L. RaV. 845, 883 (1972).
145 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1984).
- See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 116, at 168-70.
" Rule 144 was originally adopted in Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972)
[1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) q 78,487. The rule became effective
April 15, 1972. Id.
M, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1973). See Securities Act Release No. 5223, supra note 147,
for a discussion of Rule 144 as originally adopted.
141 Over the years, commentators have generally concluded that Rule 144 has been
a success. See, e.g., Lipton, Fogelson & Warnken, supra note 144, at 1183.
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Rule 144, as originally adopted, was unavailable to holders
of restricted securities of small issuers. This glaring flaw, which
somehow escaped the notice or concern of the Commission, was
caused by the requirement that all Rule 144 sales be made in
"brokers' transactions."' 50 Holders of securities in small issuers
simply could not meet this requirement.
The "brokers' transaction" requirement prohibits a holder's
using any "solicitation of orders to buy" his securities. 15I The
only way holders of securities in small issuers can sell their
securities is by soliciting a buy order. Unlike holders of securities
that are traded on NASDAQ,1 52 for example, investors in small
issuers cannot execute sales on the market by merely responding
to the bids of market makers. Instead, they (or someone on
their behalf) must make inquiries of potential purchasers, and
that action is inconsistent with the prohibition against the "so-
licitation of orders to buy.
' ' 153
In 1981, after some firm prodding by commentators, 5 4 the
Commission amended Rule 144, making it more available to
investors in small issuers. 155 Pursuant to the new section (k),
nonaffiliate investors holding restricted securities for at least
three years are no longer required to comply with the current
public information requirement, the amount limitation or, more
importantly, the broker's transaction requirement of Rule 144.156
Although the addition of section (k) is certainly laudable,
Rule 144 still is often and unnecessarily unavailable for holders
of securities in small issuers. Additionally, the rule continues to
discriminate unfairly against small issuers and their investors.
The difficulty partially stems from a restriction in Rule 144
that makes the special provisions of section (k) unavailable for
sales of restricted securities by "affiliates."' 5 7 "Affiliate" is
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(f) (1984).
See id. § 230.144(g).
,2 The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system
facilitates trading in over-the-counter securities.
"I See Campbell, supra note 20, at 1152-53.
1'4 Id. at 1150-56 & 1175-76.
'" The amendments to Rule 144 were adopted in Securities Act Release No. 6286
(February 6, 1981) (available on Lexis, Fedsec library, Release file).
VI 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (1984).
117 Id.
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
defined to include one who "controls" the particular issuer.5 s
As a result, control persons selling restricted securities cannot
utilize the provisions of section (k) but, instead, must meet all
of the requirements of Rule 144, including the brokers' trans-
action requirements. As previously noted, it is impossible for
holders of securities in a small issuer to meet the brokers'
transaction requirements. Because of this, control persons hold-
ing restricted securities in a small issuer are entirely foreclosed
from using Rule 144.
To understand the impact of this exclusion on small issuers
and their investors, one must appreciate the inherent ambiguity
and the apparent breadth of the concept of "control." Even the
proper formulation of the definition is uncertain. The Commis-
sion has defined "control" in Rule 405 as "the power to direct
... the management and policies" of the issuer. 15 9 Commenta-
tors, on the other hand, have suggested that a better test of
control is one's power or ability to cause the issuer to file a
registration statement in the event such person desires to make
a public distribution of his stock.' 6° Commentators argue that
this latter standard is more consistent with the legislative history
of and the purpose for requiring such shareholders to comply
with the registration requirements under the 1933 Act.'
16
An analysis of the case law reveals that courts typically look
at three factors in determining whether a shareholder is a control
person. These factors are the ownership of voting stock in the
" Rule 144 defines "affiliate" of an issuer as "a person that directly, or indirectly,
through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common
control with, such issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (1984).
1" See id. § 230.405. Examples of cases using this formula include: SEC v. Amer-
ican Beryllium & Oil Corp., 303 F. Supp. 912, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); SEC v. Computronic
Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (N.D. Tex. 1968); SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp.,
154 F. Supp. 395, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
161 See 2 L. Loss, supra note 68, at 780-81; E. McCoasncIC, UNDERSTANDINr THE
SEcumnas ACT AND THE SEC 69 (1948). The following are examples of cases in which
the courts apparently utilized this formulation: SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp.,
469 F.2d 20, 28-35 (10th Cir. 1972); Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 865, 866
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 1007 (1970); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev.
Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 424 F.2d
63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
161 Campbell, Defining Control in Secondary Distributions, 18 B.C. IND. & Coll.
L. REv. 37, 38-41 (1976-77).
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issuer (ten percent is usually considered significant), 62 significant
management positions with the issuer and relationships 163 with
such owners or persons in management positions. 164 These stand-
ards, however, are difficult to apply in concrete situations.
This author previously wrote on the definition of control
under the 1933 Act. In attempting to arrive at some rough rules
of thumb, he concluded:
If ... one of ... [the above] factors is present, there is a
substantial risk that a selling shareholder will be declared a
control person. The presence of two or more factors usually
results in a determination that a particular individual is a
control person....
While numerous cases support these conclusions, a rational
analysis of whether a selling shareholder is a control person
cannot be limited to a quantification of the control factors
present. The intensity of any one factor is an important ad-
ditional consideration. For example, if a shareholder's only
basis for control is voting securities, the probability of his
being a control person increases as his percentage of ownership
increases. Thus, if he owns thirty-five percent, he is more likely
to be declared a control person than if he owns only ten
percent.
Because it is impossible to pinpoint what quantity and
intensity of factors will cause a court or the Commission to
treat a selling shareholder as a control person, a quantification-
intensity analysis leaves the status of many shareholders un-
certain. To alleviate this uncertainty, it is urged that the control
analysis utilize one final touchstone-the ability to obtain reg-
istration. 
6
1
While the foregoing discussion indicates the inherent ambi-
guity in the definition of control, it also suggests the breadth of
the concept, especially as it relates to small issuers. Because
shareholders of small issuers often have a management position
,,- Id. at 41-44; Enstam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus.
LAW. 289, 315 0967-68). One commentator, however, has suggested that five percent
may be the critical figure. S.E.C. PROBLaIS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN
UNDERWRITING 19 (1962).
See Campbell, supra note 161, at 44-46.
'u Id. at 46-49.
' Id. at 49-52 (footnotes omitted).
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with the company, a relatively higher percentage of stock own-
ership and personal, family and business relationships with other
shareholders and managers, they are more likely to be considered
control persons.
Consider the following hypothetical. Assume X corporation
has assets of $2 million, equity of $500,000, and thirty-five
shareholders. Out of those thirty-five shareholders, a certain
number may own ten percent or more of X's voting stock. Ten
of the shareholders, perhaps, may be involved in the manage-
ment of X, either as officers or directors. Another ten or fifteen
shareholders may be members of the same family (or families).
Others may have close business and personal relationships with
other shareholders. The point is that in small corporations it
often may be hard to find a shareholder that clearly falls outside
the definition of control person.
It is difficult to understand why the Commission chose to
prohibit control persons from using section (k). There seems to
be no policy reason for the exclusion., 66 Further, this prohibition
has an unfortunate effect on small issuers and their investors,
since it often eliminates the availability of Rule 144 for resales
by holders of stock in small issuers. To make matters worse,
control persons who hold restricted securities in a small issuer
literally may have no other way to sell their stock. Public resales
under section 4(I) may be unavailable. 167 As described earlier,
the costs and difficulty of making the required disclosures may
practically foreclose resales under section 4(11/2). Similarly, the
costs involved in registration of the restricted securities held by
16 One reason for excluding control persons from Rule 144(k) may be because the
section also removes the rule's amount limitation. Thus, a control person, who presum-
ably owns a large block of the issuer, might be able to make large distributions without
disclosures. That concern, however, could be met by imposing an amount limitation on
control person's selling under section (k).
167 Restricted securities held by control persons are actually doubly "restricted."
First, such securities are restricted in the sense described in this Article, because they
have been purchased in a private placement, and resales must avoid the destruction of
that private placement exemption. In addition, however, sales by control persons are
limited pursuant to section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982). That
provision defines a control person as an "issuer" if the control person utilizes the
services of an "underwriter" in connection with a "distribution" of his securities. Thus,
even though a public resale under section 4(1) may be consistent with the initial private
placement, the reselling shareholder may not utilize the services of an underwriter in
connection with such a distribution of his stock, unless the transaction is othervise
exempt or registered.
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a control person in a small issuer make that alternative entirely
impractical as well.
The Commission should, therefore, amend Rule 144 to make
the special provisions of section (k) available for resales of
restricted securities by control persons. Without such an amend-
ment, Rule 144 is not an effective resale mechanism for the
securities of small issuers.
Even with this amendment, however, Rule 144 would still
discriminate against small issuers and their investors. The reason
is that holders of securities in small issuers could sell only under
section (k), which has a three year holding period, while holders
of securities of larger issuers could typically sell outside section
(k) after a two year holding period.
The Commission should not allow this discrimination to
continue. Instead, a new rule should be adopted that allows
holders' 61 of securities of small issuers to resell a limited amount
of restricted securities after a two year holding period. Although
such a new rule may appropriately contain provisions to protect
the purchasers of these restricted securities, such provisions must
be realistic and fair to small issuers and their investors.
At a minimum, the new rule should allow such holders, after
a two year holding period, to sell up to $50,000 in restricted
securities every six months. To protect the purchasers of such
restricted securities, it might be sensible to limit resales to face-
to-face, negotiated transactions 69 and to prohibit commissions
or brokers' fees in connection with the resales. These restrictions
would be an analogue to the brokers' transaction requirements
of Rule 144, since the provisions might help contain heroic
selling tactics by paid agents. Such requirements would also
ensure that the purchaser has direct access to the selling holder,
who, in turn, may have access to information about the issuer.
An additional requirement could be imposed if the issuer
were a reporting company under the 1934 Act. In such a case,
the selling holder could be required to provide the purchaser
with current information about the issuer. Specifically, the holder
' The new rule should be available to control persons holding restricted securities.
"' This requirement should not prohibit general advertising by the holder. Instead,
the rule should require only that the selling holder provide the purchaser with an
opportunity to discuss the transaction with the holder, obtain information about the
issuer from the holder and ask questions of the holder.
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should furnish the purchaser with a copy of the issuer's latest
annual report required to be delivered to shareholders pursuant
to Rule 14a-3 of the 1934 Act17 0 and a copy of the issuer's latest
Form 10-Q.' 71 This requirement would ensure access to infor-
mation without imposing overly onerous restrictions on the sell-
ing holder or the issuer.
Finally, there probably is no need to make such a new rule
available to investors in larger issuers. Thus, issuers that are
traded on NASDAQ or on a national exchange should be ineli-
gible for the rule and should, instead, be relegated to Rule 144.
4. An Overview of the Proposed Changes
The changes proposed in this Article would provide holders
with a fair and sensible array of alternatives for the resale of
restricted securities of small issuers. For the first two years after
purchasing restricted securities of small issuers, holders could
rely upon the section 4(1 1/2) exemption as a basis for resales.
After two years have elapsed, holders of restricted securities of
small issuers could rely on the new rule, proposed above, as a
basis for limited resales. Coincidentally, holders of restricted
securities in larger issuers could also sell a limited amount of
securities under Rule 144 after the two year holding period.
Finally, after a three year holding period, holders of restricted
securities in both small and large corporations could use the
provisions of Rule 144(k) and resell without any amount limi-
tations.
These changes would help end the discrimination against
small issuers and persons investing in them. This would be
accomplished without any significant sacrifice of investor pro-
tection. The proposed changes represent, it is suggested, a sen-
sible balance between the need to protect purchasers and the
need to treat small issuers and their investors fairly.
D. The Integration Doctrine
The perniciousness of the integration doctrine affects both
large and small issuers. This writer is convinced, however, that
17O 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1984).
" For an example of the use of these documents as the basis for disclosure in the
sale of securities, see item 12, Form S-4, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) q 7163, at 6267-68
(May 1, 1985).
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the tangles and snares of the doctrine generally are less trouble-
some to larger issuers. Such companies are more likely to have
an array of financing alternatives, including banks and institu-
tional and public investors, each of which may be willing to take
debt, preferred stock, or common stock. The loss of one fi-
nancing alternative through the impact of integration may not,
therefore, be as significant for such an issuer. Small issuers, on
the other hand, may not have this financing flexibility, so the
loss of a single financing alternative through the impact of
integration might be significantly more harmful.
The purpose of this section, however, is not to argue the
relative harms to large and small issuers caused by the integration
concept. Instead, the thesis promulgated here is that the integra-
tion concept should be eradicated. The concept makes no sense.
It has no defensible policy basis, limits the availablity of legiti-
mate exemptions from registration and, as a result, unnecessarily
restricts the availability of capital for small (and large) issuers.
The integration doctrine seems to rest on the notion that it
is somehow improper for a single "issue" of securities to be
offered and sold under two separate exemptions from registra-
tion or under an exemption and a registration statement. 72 As
a result, a corporation cannot, for example, sell one-half of an
issue under section 4(2) as a private transaction and one-half of
the issue as an intrastate offering pursuant to section 3(a)(ll).
The offering would not qualify as a section 4(2) transaction,
since part of the issue (the part sold pursuant to section 3(a)(11))
presumably does not meet the requirements of section 4(2), and
part of the issue (the part sold under section 4(2)) presumably
does not meet the requirements of Section 3(a)(ll).
The pivotal issue in integration questions, therefore, is whether
the two (or more) offerings are to be considered part of a single
issue (i.e., integrated) or are to be considered separate. To address
this question, the Commission developed criteria that it applies to
the facts of particular situations. These criteria, which originated
"I For general discussions of the integration concept, see Integration of Partnership
Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1981-82)
[hereinafter cited as Partnership Integration]; Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offer-
ings, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 465 (1978-79); Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under the Securities
Act: Once an Exemption, Not Always.. . ., 31 MD. L. REv. 3 (1971); Note, Securities
Regulation: Integration of Securities Offerings, 34 OKLA. L. RaV. 864 (1981).
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with the Unity Gold 7 case in 1938, are also often utilized by courts
considering integration questions. 174 Specifically, the Commission
considers the following factors:
(1) are the offerings part of a single plan of financing;
(2) do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of
security;
(3) are the offerings made at or about the same time;
(4) is the same type of consideration to be received; and
(5) are the offerings made for the same general purpose?'"7
Everyone seems to agree that these criteria are nearly impos-
sible to apply, 176 principally because neither the Commission nor
the courts have ever adequately articulated how these factors are
to be weighed or how many factors must be present in order for
integration to occur. As a result, the area remains confusing and
dangerous.
The Commission especially has been criticized in this regard,
as commentators have uncovered what appear to be glaring
inconsistencies in no-action letters from the staff. 77 Perhaps the
clearest indication of the confusion is that a few years ago the
Commission ceased issuing no-action letters on integration ques-
tions, stating, "[B]ecause of the complexity of the proposed
arrangements and the possibility that staff positions in the in-
tegration concept may be misconstrued and misapplied in other
situations, we will not be issuing interpretations in this area any
longer." 7
8
173 In re Unity Gold Corp., 3. S.E.C. 618 (1938).
" See, e.g., Value Line Fund., Inc. v. Marchs, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) i 91,523, at 94,971 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Livens v. William D. Witter,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D. Mass. 1974). For a good discussion of courts' use of
the Commission's criteria for integration, see Deaktor, supra note 172, at 505-13.
" Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) j 2270,
at 2608.
176 See, e.g., Partnership Integration, supra note 172, at 1592; Deaktor, supra note
172, at 474.
171 See, e.g., Partnership Integration, supra note 172, at 1592.
"I Clover Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 5, 1979) (available on Lexis,
Fedsec library, No act file). Recently the Commission again started issuing no action
letters on integration questions.
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In an effort to combat these difficulties, the Commission
adopted a basic safe harbor provision, which is included as a
part of Regulation D. 179 Rule 502(a) provides:
Offers and sales that are made more than six months before
the start of a Regulation D offering or are made more than
six months after completion of a Regulation D offering will
not be considered part of that Regulation D offering, so long
as during those six month periods there are no offers or sales
of securities by or for the issuer that are of the same or a
similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D .... 110
Even with these safe harbor provisions, the integration con-
cept in Regulation D continues to be fraught with confusion and
needless complexity. In addition, the irrationality of the doctrine
itself often leads to results that are inconsistent and entirely
indefensible. This can best be demonstrated by an example.
Assume that on January 1, 1984, X Corporation offered and
sold stock pursuant to Rule 505. On April 1, 1984, X Corporation
sold more stock pursuant to the intrastate exemption under
section 3(a)(ll). On December 1, 1984, X Corporation sold addi-
tional stock pursuant to Rule 506.
In this example it appears that the safe harbor provisions of
Regulation D are not available to protect the January offering
from integration with the April offering, since the April sale was
within six months of the January sale.'"' Similarly, it is clear
that safe harbor is not available for the April offering, since the
safe harbor provisions of Regulation D protect only the Regu-
lation D part of the transaction, i.e., the January transaction.
8 2
So, the safe harbor provisions are often unavailable to an-
swer integration questions related to Regulation D offerings.
Instead, one is with some frequency forced back into the com-
mon law analysis, with all the confusion and complexities pre-
viously discussed.
I-, Essentially, the same pattern of safe harbor is present in Rule 147. 17 C.F.R. §
230.147(b)(2) (1984).
Id. § 230.502(a).
J. HICKS, 1983 LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS: REGULATION D 130 (1983). Sur-
prisingly, the language of Rule 502(c) does not answer this question directly.
" See the example in Securities Act Release No. 6339 (Aug. 7, 1981), [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,014, at 84,462 n.25.
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Continuing the analysis of this hypothetical, one must deter-
mine if the December offering is integrated into the January
offering, thereby possibly eliminating the availability of Rule 505
for the January offering.'83 The protection of the safe harbor
provisions in that instance depends on what can only be consid-
ered a strange criterion. It depends on whether the April 1
offering was the "same or similar class" of securities as the
January offering.8 4 One should pause to consider why the con-
tractual terms of the securities sold in the April offering should
have anything to do with whether the December offering con-
taminates the January offering. Obviously, one cannot answer
the question, since the result is illogical.
In considering whether the January or April offering may be
integrated into the December offering, thereby possibly elimi-
nating the availability of Rule 506 for the December offering,
one is confronted with a mystic result. The December offering
is apparently protected from both the April and the January
offerings by the safe harbor provisions of Regulation D.1s5 This
is true even though the safe harbor provisions protect neither
the January nor April offerings from the December offering,
unless, of course, the April offering were of a different class of
securities than the January offering, in which case the January
offering would be protected from the December offering by the
safe harbor.
If all of this seems confusing, it is. The confusion, at least
in part, is generated by the Commission's attempt to codify a
"I If the Rule 505 offering and the Rule 506 offering were integrated, "the issuer
would have to evaluate all characteristics of the combined transactions (e.g., number of
investors, aggregate offering price, etc.) when determining the availability of an exemp-
tion." Securities Act Release No. 6389 (March 8, 1982), [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 83,106, at 84,918 n.31.
114 It is interesting that a sale of a dissimilar class of securities in the April offering
ensures that safe harbor will be available to protect the January offering from the
December offering, but the dissimilar class does not ensure that the January offering is
protected from the April offering by safe harbor. Rather, as stated in the text, the
determination of integration of the January and April offerings depends on traditional
integration concepts. J. HICKS, supra note 181, at 131.
"I Under the terms of the hypothetical, there were no sales during the six month
period prior to the Rule 506 offering (i.e., prior to the December offering). Thus,
because the "window period" for the December offering was "clean," the December
offering is protected by safe harbor from the April and January offerings. This assumes
no sales in the window period following the December offering. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(a) (1984).
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concept that makes no sense. Not suprisingly, complexity and
arbitrariness result and now, as the foregoing example demon-
strates, permeate the safe harbor provisions of Regulation D.
The solution to these problems is not to send the staff of
the Commission scurrying about to adjust the safe harbor cri-
teria. Instead, the proper solution is to eradicate the concept of
integration. To accomplish this, however, the Commission and
the courts must fully comprehend the irrationality of the inte-
gration doctrine.
It is simple to demonstrate that, at the most fundamental
level, integration makes no sense. Indeed, it is so easy that this
writer is somewhat at a loss to understand why the concept first
developed 8 6 and is unable to understand how the concept has
escaped intense criticism over the years.
Consider, for example, the common law criteria that are
applied to solve integration questions. These criteria in no way
relate to investor protection. Instead, they are arbitrary criteria
developed by the Commission to answer the irrelevant question
of whether two (or more) offerings constitute a single issue. The
nonsense of these criteria and, indeed, the nonsense of the
concept of integration itself, can be vividly demonstrated by the
following hypothetical.
Assume that on January 1, 1985, X Corporation offered and
sold $100,000 in common stock pursuant to section 4(2). X
Corporation proposes to sell another $100,000 in common stock
on March 1, 1985, but this second offering will be undertaken as
an intrastate offering under section 3(a)(ll). Each offering clearly
meets the requirements of the respective exemptions, except to
the extent that the exemptions may be fouled by the integration
concept.
Applying the integration concept to the foregoing situation,
the availability of section 4(2) for the January offering depends
either on effectively separating that offering from the proposed
March offering or on foregoing the March offering, at least for
now. There is no logical reason why the issuer should be forced
into either solution. Both solutions penalize the issuer and nei-
ther affords any additional protection to investors.
1 ' For a discussion of the origin and development of the integration doctrine, see
Partnership Integration, supra note 172, at 1593-1607; Deaktor, supra note 172, at 492-
525.
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Suppose, for example, that the issuer attempts to avoid the
integration by separating the offerings. The issuer would prob-
ably make the March offering a different class of securities,"
perhaps debt or preferred stocks, which, by assumption, are not
the investment contracts the issuer wants to sell to the March
investors. Also, in order to bolster the claim that the offerings
were not made at or about the same time, the issuer would try
to delay the March offering as long as possible.1 8 Again, by
assumption, this is not what the issuer wants to do. It, instead,
wants its financing in March.
Neither of the foregoing adjustments adds one whit to the
protection of the January investors. Clearly, the January inves-
tors are not protected either by offering a separate class of
securities in March, delaying the March offering or foregoing
the March offering altogether. In fact, the January investors are
actually harmed by each solution, since each alternative puts X
Corporation in a less-than-optimum situation and thus increases
the risk that X Corporation cannot survive.
Similarly, the March investors, who will purchase under a
valid, intrastate exemption, are not afforded additional protec-
tion by any of the foregoing solutions. Neither changing the
terms of the contract under which they are sold nor delaying the
offering date increases the protection of these investors.
This leads to the conclusion that the factors used to deter-
mine the separateness of offerings are entirely arbitrary. The
presence or absence of those factors have no bearing on any
investors' need for the protection of the 1933 Act. Perhaps one
could accept the arbitrariness of these criteria if the concept of
integration were itself sensible. Unfortunately, it is not.
Consider again the immediately preceding hypothetical. The
assumption of the hypothetical is that the January offering met
all of the requirements for a private placement under section
4(2). This means that each investor had access to the same
information contained in a registration statement and had the
ability to evaluate the merits and risks of the investment.1S9
'"' See text accompanying note 175 supra.
' Id.
, Today there is probably a general agreement that an exemption pursuant to
section 4(2) requires that offerees and purchasers be sophisticated and have access to
information about the issue. See Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue
Sky Regulation, 10 J. CoRp. LAW 553, 560-61 (1985).
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Obviously, a subsequent intrastate offering under section 3(a)(ll)
has no impact on the presence of these bases for the section 4(2)
exemption. The January investors are protected by their sophis-
tication and access to information, the prerequisites for a section
4(2) offering, irrespective of whether or when the intrastate
offering occurs.
With regard to the March offering, the assumption is that it
meets the requirements of the intrastate exemption under section
3(a)(ll). In such a case, Congress was apparently willing to rely
on the geographic proximity between the issuer and the investor
to provide the necessary access to information about the issuer.190
Again, the existence of prior offerings obviously has no impact
on whether such proximity exists.
This demonstrates the simple notion that any offer or sale
of securities that meets either the registration requirements or
the exemption requirements should not be contaminated by other
offers or sales. So long as any transaction meets the requirements
of the 1933 Act, investors are adequately protected either by
registration and delivery of a prospectus or by circumstances
and policy bases that Congress has deemed adequate to dispense
with the registration and prospectus requirements.
This line of reasoning is entirely applicable to Regulation D.
Essentially, therefore, if an issuer sells $500,000 in securities
pursuant to Rule 504 on March 1, he should be able to sell
another $2 million in securities on April 1 pursuant to Rule 505
(or any other exemption) without concern that the prior offering
will be integrated into his April offering. Each exemption has
(or should have) sound policy bases, which are unaffected by
subsequent or prior sales.
Admittedly the elimination of the integration concept would
necessitate certain technical adjustments in Regulation D, since
the Commission would have to address matters that presently
0" The philosophical bases for section 3(a)(ll) are less than crystal clear. See Hicks,
Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L. REv. 463, 499 (1973-74). Access to
information due to the geographical proximity between the issuer and the investor,
however, is certainly one of the commonly cited bases for section 3(a)(ll). Id. See also
Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,617, at 83,650 ("[T]he primary purpose of the intrastate exemption
was to allow an essentially local business to raise money within the state where the
investors would be likely to be familiar with the business and with the management
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
are resolved by integration. For example, referring back to the
hypothetical in the immediately preceding paragraph, the Com-
mission would have to determine if the purchasers under the
Rule 504 offering would be counted in determining the thirty-
five purchaser limit of Rule 505. At the present time the thirty-
five purchaser limitation is with respect to "any offering."' 9 '
The resolution of this and other technical questions involves no
unusual difficulty and certainly should not deter the Commission
from ridding itself of the irrational integration concept.
IV. CONCLUSION
Small issuers must have room to operate in our society. They
are a vital force in our economy and are entitled to fair treat-
ment. This does not require, however, that the Commission
abandon its duty to protect investors. It means only that the
Commission, in drafting its rules and enforcing and interpreting
the relevant laws and regulations, should give due consideration
to the general and special needs of small issuers.
Regulation D is a step in that direction. It represents a real
attempt by the Commission to balance the need for disclosure
against the stifling effect of overregulation, a critical balance
that is essential to any sensible implementation of the 1933 Act.
Now, however, the Commission needs to turn its attention
to some of the particular requirements of Regulation D and
should excise some of the tired, old concepts that unnecessarily
throttle capital formation. In that regard, this writer has made
four suggestions.
First, the prohibition against general advertising should be
removed, to the extent it is possible under existing precedent.
Small issuers need the right to engage in general advertising to
find potential investors. Investors are not harmed by general
advertising, at least so long as the applicable criteria for the
exemptions, for example, disclosure and sophistication, are met
prior to each purchase.
Second, the requirement to deliver S-18 information to inves-
tors should be applicable only when offerings exceed $1 million.
The expense and difficulty of complying with the S-18 disclosure
19, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1984).
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requirements make it unattractive or impossible to do a Regu-
lation D deal in the range of $500,000 to $1 million. The Com-
mission, therefore, should rely on the antifraud rules to ensure
disclosure for transactions up to $1 million.
Third, Rule 144, the principal vehicle for resale of securities
purchased under Regulation D, should be modified to make
section (k) available for resales by control persons. Additionally,
the Commission should adopt a new rule that allows investors
in small issuers to sell restricted securities after a two year
holding period. These changes would extend to investors in small
issuers the resale opportunities that are available to investors in
larger issuers.
Finally, the integration concept should be eliminated. Each
offer and sale of securities should be evaluated to determine
whether that particular offer or sale meets either the registration
requirements or the requirements for an exemption from regis-
tration. If it does, other transactions in the security are irrele-
vant. Those other transactions in no way compromise the policy
bases for the legal sales.
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